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EFFECT OF THE CONSOLIDATED ROCK PRODUCTS
DECISION ON RAILROAD REORGANIZATIONS
UNDER SECTION 77
CHRONIC financial distress has plagued American railroads, and financial
reorganization has come to be the standard avenue of escape. But effective
rehabilitation techniques remain a matter for controversy. Dissatisfaction
with the cumbersome equity receivership and the acute need for overhauling
railroad financial structures precipitated by the depression led to the enact-
ment in 1933 of remedial legislation under the bankruptcy power.1 But
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practical defects which subsequently became apparent in Section 772 resulted
in its complete revision in 1935.3 Since that time experience and investi-
gations 4 have led to the proposal and consideration of additional measures5
designed to accelerate the procedure and clarify the general standards of
Section 77 as amended, but no additional legislation has been enacted.0 The
abortive attempts at legislative improvement of Section 77 were prompted
by fears, based upon past experience, that the statute might provide an
unsatisfactory vehicle for reorganizing the larger railroad properties. The
problems which were envisaged as most likely to cause difficulty tinder
Section 77 can be broadly categorized into two groups: procedural problems
in effecting expeditious reorganizations and formulation of proper standards
to test fair and equitable plans compatible with the public interest. Fore-
most among the procedural issues was the neec for precise definition of the
respective functions of court and Commission in reorganization. 7 The prob-
lem of standards was largely concerned with the extent to which past and
prospective earning power should control value determinations under Sec-
tion 77.8
2. See Hearings before Committee on Judiciary on H. R. 6249, 74th Coug., 1st
Sess. (1935) 13-16, 26, 32, 281; Wehle, Railroad Reorganization under Section 77 of
the Bankruptcy Act: New Legislation Suggested (1934) 44 YALE I,. j. 197; Craven
and Fuller, The 1935 Amcndmcnts of the Railroad Bankruptcy Law (1936) 49 IIARWV.
L. REv. 1254.
3. 49 STAT. 911 (1935), 11 U. S. C. §205 (1940).
4. See REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE PIURSUANT TrO S. Rs,. 71,
74th Cong., 1st Sess., contained in Hearings before Conmmittee on Interstate Commerce on
S. 1869, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 135-215; RE'ORT OF COMMITTEE AvroINTED lBv THEn:
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO SUBMIT RECOM-MENDATIONS UPON THE GENERAL
TRANSPORTATION SITUATION (1938) 25-30.
5. The Wheeler-Truman Bill was thoroughly considered by the Senate and passed
by that body in 1939. See SEN. REIP. No. 454, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) ; Hearings
before Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 1869, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) ; 84
CONG. Rzc. 6209-45, 6311 (1939). The" McLaughlin Bill was introduced in the House
in 1940. 86 CONG. REc. 4770 (1940).
6. In 1939, roads which were only temporarily afflicted by the blight of depression
were afforded expeditious relief by the enactment of Chapter XV of the Bankruptcy
Act. 53 STAT. 1134 (1939), 11 U. S. C. §§ 1200-55 (1940). The act permitted solvent
roads whose prospects appeared good to make voluntary adjustments of bond interest
or principal maturities without a full-fledged reorganization. Under this chapter, 'the
Baltimore & Ohio was able to change its fixed interest on certain junior securities to a
contingent basis temporarily and to extend maturities. In re Baltimore & 0. R. R., 29
F. Supp. 608 (D. Md. 1939). The Lehigh Valley postponed certain interest for a live-
year period and extended maturities. In re Lehigh Valley R. R. Co,, 34 F. Supp. 753
(E. D. Pa. 1940). See also Ewen v. Peoria & E. Ry. Co., 34 F. Supp. 332 (S. D. N. Y.
1940); In re Montana, W. & S. R. R. Co., 32 F. Supp. 200 (D. Mont. 1940).
7. See Hearings before Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 1869, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1939) 244-60; REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT '1O
SUBMIT RF.COmMENDATIONS UPON THE GENERAL TRANSPORTATION SITUATION (1938)
25-28.
8. See Hearings before Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 1869, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1939) 265-88.
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The background of present controversy in railroad reorganization stem;
from the Supreme Court's decision in Consolidated Roc: Products Compalny
v. Du Bois.9 Although this case arose under Section 77B, the opinion If
the Court announced broad rules applicable to reorganizations generally.
In the Consolidated case a plan devised under Section 77B had been con-
firmed by the district court although no findings of value either with respcct
to the enterprise as a whole or with respect to the various classes of claims
had been made or attempted. The Supreme Court held that a plan of re-
organization could not be approved by the court where adequate valuation
data were lacking. The opinion stated that valuation of (operating properties
in reorganization should be based upon a capitalization of prospective earn-
ings. The decision further clarified standards of fairness applicable under
present reorganization procedure. Requirements of financial feasibility may
necessitate the allocation of inferior types of securities in the new company
to senior classes of creditors. But to satisfy fair and equitable standards,
the Court indicated that the proposed allocation must "fully compensate"
the senior claimant for his lost rights before junior interests may participate.
The rules enunciated in the Consolidated Rock Products case settled per-
plexing issues in reorganization procedure under Section 77B and Chapter
X. But, since certain differences in statutory machinery exist betveen, those
portions of the Act and Section 77, the impact uf the case upon the latter
statute was left in doubt. The problem of construing Section 77 in light
of the Consolidatcd Rock Products decision has confronted the Circuit
Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in three recent case-
-the Western Pacific,'0 the St. Paid," and the Chicago r Northweslcrnr':
reorganizations.
Ifi all three cases, plans formulated after lengthy hearings before the
ICC 13 had been approved by the district courts. 14 In each of the cases,
stockholders who were eliminated from participation in the reorganization
objected to the amount and character of total capitalization figures e;tah-
lished by the Commission. And certain classes of creditors objected to the
participation alloted them as compared with the allocations to other group-.
9. 312 U. S. 510 (1941). For the general implications of the case, sce I)can, A/
Reziew of the Law of Corporate Rcorqaniiations (1941) 2o Con: . L Q. 537; Ui!w01ri",
"Fair and Equitable" Plan of Rcorgani'ation: A Clearer Concept (1941) 2t C)c.x. I.
Q. 592; Comment (1941) 18 N.Y. U. L. Q. REv. 459; Comment (1941) 51 Y, tP- I.. S5.
10. In re Western P. R. R., 124 F. (2d) 136 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941).
11. In re Chicago, If., St. P. & P. R. R., 124 F. (2d 754 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941 s.
12. In re Chicago & N. V. Ry., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. (3d cd. 1941) 
€[53,619 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1942).
13. Western P. R. R. Reorganization, 230 I. C. C. 61 (1938), modified, 233 I. C. C.
409 (1939); Chicago & N. W. Ry. Reorganization, 236 I. C C. 575 (1939); Chicago,
.f., St. P. & P. R. R. Reorganization, 239 I. C. C. 485 (1940).
14. In re Western P. R. R., 34 F. Supp. 493 (N. D. Cal. 1940); In re Chicago &
N. W. Ry., 35 F. Supp. 230 (N. D. IlI. 1940); In re Chicago, It., St. P. & P. R. IL,
36 F. Supp. 193 (N. D. Ill. 1940).
1942]
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The lower court orders approving the ICC plans were reversed in the
Wl'estcrn Pacific' 5 and St. Paul' cases. This result was specifically based
upon the Consolidated Rock Products decision. Both courts indicated that
under Section 77(e) the judge must exercise an independent judgment on
the fairness of proposed plans, and, relying upon the Consolidated Rock
Products case, both held that the ICC's findings of fact on valuation data
were insufficient to enable the district courts to exercise their statutory
duties intelligently. In the St. Paul case the court appeared to reach this
result reluctantly. 17 The opinion indicated that there was ample evidence
in the record and in the Commission's report to support the plan in all its
aspects. But the Consolidated Rock Products case, deemed controlling, was
held to require precise findings of fact by the Commission which had not
been made. The same result was avoided in the Chicago & Northwestern
case by the court's holding that the requirement of fuller findings of fact
on valuation data was waived in view of the overwhelming support of the
15. The capital structure of the Western Pacific road prior to reorganization was
comparatively simple. In addition to trustee's certificates and equipment obligations
which were left undisturbed, the debtor had first mortgage 5% bonds, collateral notes,
unsecured claims and preferred and common stocks outstanding. The unsecured clains
and stocks were found by the ICC to have no value and were accorded no participation.
The notes were held by the RFC, RCC and the A. C. James Co., and were secured
largely by securities of the debtor, its subsidiaries and affiliates. The only stockholder,
a holding company, objected in the courts to the capitalization of the enterprise estab-
lished by the ICC. The collateral noteholders objected to the relative distribution of
securities among themselves. In reversing the lower court order, the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the report and order of the Commission did
not contain sufficient findings of fact in regard to the value of the property as a whole,
the value of the claims of each class of creditors, and the value of new securities to be
issued by the reorganized corporation. Because of the lack of essential findings as to
value, tlje court indicated that it was in no position to exercise its statutory function.
16. The capital structure of the St. Paid road was complex. In the courts, stock-
holders who had been eliminated from participation objected to the capitalization of the
enterprise. On appeal they introduced recent statistics to the effect that gross operating
revenues in early 1941 had increased 22.8% over 1940 and estimated that the income
available for fixed charges in 1941 would be substantially increased. The St. Paul had
six main divisions prior to reorganization, each covered by a first lien and junior mort-
gages. Various divisional mortgage bondholders objected to their proportionate par-
ticipation. After reviewing the evidence and report of the Commission, the court held
that there was ample support for the finding of no value in the stockholder interests, even
if recent earnings were considered, and indicated that the total capitalization figure estab-
lished by the ICC was equivalent to a finding of value for the enterprise as a whole, In
regard to the relative disposition of securities among the various classes of creditors,
however, the court held that the ICC had not made sufficient findings of fact in valuing
the various creditor interests. Hence the court could not intelligently exercise its statu-
tory function in reviewing the plan.
17. See li re Chicago, I., St. P. & P. R. R., 124 F. (2d) 754, 765 (C. C. A. 7th,
1941).
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plan by creditors and the insignificant holdings of objectors. Hence, the
order of the trial court approving the plan was affirmed."'
In both the St. Paid and Chicago &' Northzeestern cases, the court at-
tempted to formulate standards to guide the ICC in making iti value deter-
minations. It indicated that prospective earning power - the test enunciated
in the Consolidated case- is the primary factor to be considered in valuing
properties for reorganization purposes. However, the court indicated that
this rule was qualified in its application tu railroad reorganizations by the
express wording of Section 77(e).19
Reversal of the Western Pacific and St. Paul orders will delay the con-
summation of those reorganizations for at least another eighteen months.
The Supreme Court will probably grant petitions for certiorari in both
cases.20 If the appellate court rulings are upheld, the plans will revert to
the Commission for the requisite findings of value. Even if the Supreme
Court reverses and holds that sufficient valuation data are available to permit
an intelligent exercise of the court's statutory function, the cases must again
be remanded to the Circuit Courts of Appeals for a determination that the
plans are fair and equitable. Further uncertainty has been caused by the
action of the district court in remanding part of the New York, Ncwv Haven
& Hartford reorganization to the Commission.21 And following the WVestern
Pacific and St. Paul decisions, the district court requested parties to file
statements in the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific reorganization showing
cause why that plan should not be remanded to the Commission on similar
18. Objections raised in the Chica.io t Northwestern case were similar to tho-e
made in the St. Pard case. The court again ruled against the objections of stoc-kholderFi
in regard to the amount and character of total enterprise value, holding that the CGnm-
mission had found a total capitalization figure for the system, that the evidence amply
supported the figure, and that the court, in exercising its independent judgment, agree.
with the Commission's finding that the equity of the stockholders w:as %ithout vahw.
96.2% of the creditors voting accepted the plan. Only one class of creditor, the hold-
ers of a comparatively small issue of divisiolial lien bonds, failed ti accept the plan by
the requisite two-thirds majority. The District Court had made a specific finding th:at
the plan was fair and equitable as to this group and approved it river the Oijectiun. All-
proximately one-third of the creditors did not vte. But the appellate cuurt, indicating it.
whole-hearted indorsement of the plan, declared that it accepted the respunsibility for
protecting them and voted their interests in favur of the plan. The suppurt of the cred-
itors was deemed to operate as a waiver of the requirement sof fuller finding-;. In view
of Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U. S. 106 (l1039), the waiver argument
seems unsound.
19. See ln re Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R., 124 F. (2d) 754, 7(63, 76.4, 7(6 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1941) ; In re Chicago & N. W. Ry., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. (3d ed. 1441) 3,19
(C. C. A. 7th, 1942).
20. Petitions for certiorari have been filed in all three cages. (19421 l0 U. S. L.
WEEK 3214, 3247, 3276.
21. In re New York, N. H. & H. R. R., D. Conn.. Dec. 8, 1941. A new plan meet-
ing the objections raised by the court has recently been presented to the ICC. X. Y.
Times, April 5, 1942, § 3, p. 1, col. 6.
1942]
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grounds. 22 But despite the additional delay and the cloak of uncertainty
shrouding pending cases, the most perplexing problems confronting courts
and Commission under Section 77 are narrowly defined and presented in
these cases. Consequently, the prospects of a comprehensive Supreme Court
review of these issues makes the outlook on the railroad reorganization front
more promising.
For purposes of discussion, the problems arising out of Section 77 as
construed in these recent cases will be grouped under two heads- pro-
cedural problems, and standards of valuation applicable to railroad reor-
ganization in view of the express wording of Section 77(e) and the rule
announced in the Consolidated Rock Products decision.
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
Function of Court and Commission. Petitions tinder Section 77 are pre-
sented to a district court which assumes jurisdiction over the property of
the railroad.23 Operation of the road continues tinder a trustee subject to
the supervision of the court.24 Plans of reorganization are submitted by the
parties to the ICC and hearings are held on the plans before that body, all
interested parties being permitted to intervene. 25 The Commission certifies
its approved plan to the court and must render a report in which it is
required to state fully the reasons for its conclusions.20 A transcript of the
proceedings before the Commission must also be submitted to the court.
The court is then directed to receive written objections to the proposed
plan and hold hearings on such objections.27 After the hearing, if the plan
is approved, the Commission submits it to creditors of each class for ac-
ceptance or rejection,2 8 and the plan is then sent to the court for final dis-
position. 29 If the court does not approve the plan, it may refer the pro-
ceedings back to the Commission or dismiss, in its discretion. 0 As a
prerequisite to approval, the court must be satisfied, inter alia, that the plan
conforms to the requirements of subsection 77(b), is fair and equitable, and
provides for proper participation by various interests. 31
Failure to define completely and specifically the respective areas of activity
of court and Commission has been a source of considerable confusion in
construing Section 77. Moreover, no cases directly involving the issue have
been presented to the Supreme Court, although it has cursorily touched on
22. (1941) 154 Comm. & FiN. CHIRON. 1541.
23. Section 77(a).
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the matter.3 2 A variety of interpretations has come from lower courts
which have dealt with the problem. At one extreme are cases in which the
"public" functions of the Commission are distinguished from the more prosaic
determinations of private legal rights by courts.m These public functions
presumably include the technical phases of reorganization -the ascertain-
ment of total capitalization, formulation of a new security structure, and the
outlining of the financial details to be included in the new securities issued.
These matters are alleged to be solely for Commission determination and
should be held conclusive on the courts unless it is shown that the Com-
mission applied improper standards, or that its finding is wholly unsupported
by the evidence.34 Support for this argument can be found in the structure
of Section 77. Under 77(d) the Commission, as a prerequisite to its ap-
proval of a plan, must be satisfied that it conforms to subsections (b) and
(e) and "will be compatible with the public interest." The court tnder
77(e), on the other hand, is not required to make a finding that the plan
conforms to the public interest.
An intermediate approach has confined the function of the court to cor-
recting the Commission for errors of law and setting aside findings of fact
not supported by the evidence.3 5 Other tribunals have merely accepted tile
Commission's figures, expressing confidence in the superior experience of
that body in making technical determinations, and have thus avoided the
issue of the weight to be accorded Commission conclusions.30
At the opposite extreme are decisions which regard the duties of the court
in more comprehensive terms. These cases express the view that all im-
portant phases of reorganization proceedings call for an informed, inde-
pendent judgment on the part of the court which is not concluded by any
determination made by the Commission, even in the case of technical valua-
32. Warren v. Palmer, 310 U. S. 132, 138 (1940): Palmer v. Massachusetts, 30A
U. S. 79, 87 (1939). In both cases the court indicated that the administrative functions
of the Commission and the judicial functions of the courts work ceoveratively undcr
§ 77. In the latter opinion the court stated that district courts were not given, under thi.
legislation, the same scope as to bankrupt railroads that they have in dealing %%ith 4 ,thr
bankrupt estates. But the court made no attempt to define this scope of authority.
33. Iz re Western P. R. R., 34 F. Supp. 493 (N. D. Cal. 1940), rcd, 124 F. (2d
136 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941); In re Erie R. r, 37 F. Supp. 237 (N. D. Ohi, 19401. See
Swaine, Present Staetrs of Railroad Reorganications and Lejislaioz .ltffclinq Thin
(1941) 18 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rxv. 161, 171.
34. In re Western P. R. R., 34 F. Supp. 493, 501 (N. D. Cal. 1940), rc-,d, 124 F.
(2d) 136 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941); In re Erie R. R., 37 F. Supp. 237, 244 (X. D. Obi,o
1940).
35. In re Chicago, ., St. P. & P. R. M, 36 F. Supp. 193, 202-03 (N. D. III. 1 4tH,
rev'd, 124 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941); In re Missouri P. R. R., 39 F. Supi.. 43-s.
442 (E. D. Mo. 1941).
36. In re Chicago & N. W. Ry., 35 F. Supp. 230 (N. D. Iil. 1940), aff'd. C. C. H.
Bankr. Serv. (3d ed. 1941) f153,619 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942); In re Chicago G. W. R. R.,
29 F. Supp. 149 (N. D. Ill. 1939).
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tion 'data.37 This argument is based upon prior Supreme Court decisions
and upon the express mandate of 77(e).
Under Section 77 as it now stands, the last argument appears to be the
most plausible. Congress apparently constituted coordinate authorities in
the administration of railroad properties in reorganization. Even if Supreme
Court cases reiterating the informed, independent judgment rule in other
situations are not entirely applicable under Section 77,58 at least the judge
must perform his express statutory duties in passing upon proposed plans.
The judge must be satisfied, inter alia, that a plan complies with subsection
(b) of Section 77, is fair and equitable, duly recognizes the rights of and
does not discriminate against each class of creditors and stockholders, and
conforms to the law of the land in regard to participation. 0 Moreover,
additional testimony may be taken in the courts, although this is apparently
a limited practice.40 And, although Congress has frequently endowed the
findings of administrative bodies with substantial authority on review,41 it
chose not to do so here. On the whole, the statute seems to contemplate
unlimited attack on plans in the courts despite the fact that the judge can-
37. In re Western P. R. R., 124 F. (2d) 136 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941) ; In re New York,
N. H. & H. R. R., D. Conn., Dec. 8, 1941; In re Denver & R. G. W. R. R., 38 F. Supp.
106 (D. Colo. 1940).
38. The rule that courts must exercise an informed, independent judgment in pass-
ing on proposed plans of reorganization developed under equity receivership procedure
where plans were formulated initially by the parties themselves and were then submitted
to the court for approval. The underlying purpose of the rule was to insure an adequate
judicial check on the fairness of the plan. National Surety Co. v. Coriell, 289 U. S. 426,
436 (1939); First Nat'l Bank of Cincinnati v. Flershem, 290 U. S. 504, 525 (1934).
The same rule has been carried over into reorganization proceedings under the bank-
ruptcy power. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U. S. 106, 115 (1939) (77B
proceeding) ; Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U. S. 510 (1941) (77B pro-
ceeding) ; American United Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Avon Park, 311 U. S. 138 (1940)
(Chapter IX proceeding). Under § 77, however, the same reasons for applying the
rule are not so apparent, inasmuch as initial formulation of railroad reorganization plans
rests with the competent ICC and complete review by the courts constitutes a double
check. The situation is different even from Chapter X where the SEC exercises all
advisory function only and the bulk of authority in effecting plans is exercised by the
courts.
39. Section 77(e).
40. Swaine, Present Status of Railroad Reorganizatlons and Legislation Affeclibi
Them (1941) 18 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 161, 178. In some courts, additional testimony has
been taken and exhibits introduced. But apparently the scope of such testimony is limited.
In re Chicago & N. W. Ry. (N. D. Ill., Order No. 420, June 27, 1940); In re Chicago
& E. I. Ry. (N. D. 11., June 16, 1939); In re Chicago G. W. R. R., 29 F. Supp. 149,
154 (N. D. Ill. 1939); In re Erie R. R., 37 F. Supp. 237, 242 (N. D. Ohio 1940). In
other cases, judges have held informal conferences with interested parties. In re Deli-
ver & R. G. W. R. R., 38 F. Supp. 106 (D. Colo. 1940) ; In re Louisiana & N. W. R. R,
36 F. Supp. 636 (S. D. N. Y. 1938).
41. See, e.g., SECURITIES ExcH. AcT, 48 STAT. 901-02 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78y
(1940) ; PUBLIC UILiTY AcT, 49 STAT. 834-35 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79 (1940) ; FuEDtMA
TRADE Coilm. ACT, 52 STAT. 112-13 (1938), 15 U. S. C. §45(c) (1940).
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not "dot an i or cross a t"- but must refer the plan back to the Cominis-
sion for constructive amendment. 43 ,The argumnent distinguishing between
"public" and "private" functions is patently inadequate. A finding of total
capitalization may in one sense be a "public" function, yet, in order to lie
satisfied that a plan is fair and equitable to private interests, the judge would
be compelled to review that finding. The same observation applies to other
determinations of value. If the judge is satisfied that a particular class of
creditors receives fair participation, he must likewise be satisfied that the
underlying determination of value is fair.44 In addition, the statute speci-
fically provides for judicial review of the permissible amount of fixed
charges,45 a function which would normally be classified as "public". It is,
therefore, unlikely that Congress intended any comprehensive classification
of functions on a "public-private" rationale.
But whatever the theory voiced by the lower courts in regard to their
duties under the statute, in practice there has been a natural tendency to
accord considerable weight to Commission conclusions. In few cases has
judicial review resulted in a detailed criticism of plans approved by the
ICC.4 6 Under present procedure, the incentive for critical analysis appear-
to be tempered by the desire of judges to permit the lengthy proceedings
to terminate at the earliest moment. 47 The desirability of suggesting minor
adjustments is overbalanced by the prospects of putting into effect what on
the whole appears to be a good plan.48
42. See remarks of Senator Wheeler during delbate cin the propsscd Whecler-Tr-
man Bill. 84 CoNG. REc. 6210 (1939).
43. Section 77(d) provides that "no plan shall be appruvoil or confirninl by the
judge unless the plan shall first have been approved by the Commission and certified t,#
the court."
44. See In rc New York, N. H. & H. R. R., D. Conn., Dec. 8. 1941, vdhere the
court stated: "I cannot forget that the first paragraph of subdivision (e) resjuirc. the
judge to approve the plan only 'if satisfied that it . . . is fair and equitalle . . . and
does not discriminate against any class of creditors, etc.' Construing the Act as a vNlsle,
I think it means that the judge, although without power to make any effective pro-
posals as to value, is required to act upon an independent intelligence in approving a
plan for its fairness, even though that ultimate issue involves underlying valus."
45. The judge must be satisfied, under § 77(e), that the plan conforms to the provi-
sions of § 77(b). One of the provisions of § 77(b) states that a plan shall provide fi.ol
charges in relation to the expected course of income. § 77(b) (4).
46. In two cases the review of the courts appears to have been espccially thurouligh.
In re Xew York, N. H. & H. R. R., D. Conn., Dec. 8, 1941; In re Denver & R. G. W.
R. R-, 38 F. Supp. 106 (D. Colo. 1941). In the latter case, the district judge had han-
died an earlier equity receivership proceeding involving the same road.
47. This is illustrated by the reluctance of the court to reverse in the St. Paul case,
and its adoption of the tenuous "waiver" argument as a basis for affirming the Cicago
& Northwestern plan. See p. 970 supra.
48. Some courts have frankly declared their desire to see proceedings terminate.
. . the plan is a good plan, and . . . there comes a time in all reorganization pro-
ceedings when it is much more desirable to get the property out of court under a guAd
plan than it is to delay the matter in court in order to attempt to formulate a perfect
19421
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This is a familiar story in reorganization. Plans submitted to a tribunal
after years of preparation have generally been approved. This was true of
the courts under the equity receivership procedure,4 and was largely respon-
sible for the ineffectiveness of the Interstate Commerce Commission's check
on plans of reorganization following the legislation of 1920."° A different
result could hardly be expected under Section 77, where the initial prepara-
tion of a plan rests in the hands of so competent an authority as the ICC.
Moreover, experience testifies that the formulation of a plan of reorganiza-
tion for complex railroad properties is a unitary problem. Although the ICC
has indicated that strictly legal problems are for court determination, it has
been compelled to decide all legal issues in order to perfect its plans. In
the Western Pacific case, for example, the Commission spent considerable
time in determining the extent of the lien of first mortgage bondholders under
an after-acquired property clause.51 The coordinate functions of court and
Commission now contemplated in the statute do not in practice provide an
additional protection to investors sufficient to outweigh the delay involved.
In the light of past experience and of the inherent difficulties entailed in
complete judicial review in this type of case9 2 any immediate change in the
attitude of the courts does not seem likely.
Legislation recognizing and correcting this aspect of Section 77 is desir-
able. The function of formulating a plan of reorganization should be vested
in one body. This result could be achieved in one of two ways -by adopting
a procedure similar to Chapter X, in which the office of the Commission
would be advisory only 53 and the bulk of authority would remain with the
plan." In re Chicago & N. W. Ry., 35 F. Supp. 230, 257 (N. D. Ill. 1940) ; cf. Chicago
& E. I. Ry., N. D. Ill., June 16, 1939.
49. The court's functions in scrutinizing plans under equity receivership procedure
were greatly curtailed by the undesirability of upsetting the work of months or year
once the plan reached the court stage. See SEC REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INYRSTIA-
TION OF THE WORK, AcrivirsEs, PERSONNEL AND FuNcTiONS OF PROTFcTIVE AND REOn-
GANIZATION CoMManmEs (1940) Pt. VIII, p. 51; Craven and Fuller, The 1935 Amend-
ments of the Railroad Bankruptcy Law (1936) 49 HARV. L. RFv. 1254, 1256.
50. In 1920 the Commission was given power to approve all issues of railroad se-
curities. 41 STAT. 494 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 20a (1940). As was true of the courts,
however, the Commission could exercise little effective control because plans reached
that body at a late stage of the proceedings. "The Commission has not rejected outright
any of the forty odd plans submitted to it since 1920, though in a few eases it hasq re-
quired minor changes." MOULTON, THE AMERICAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMI (1933)
325.
51. See Western P. R. R. Reorganization, 230 I. C. C. 61, 97-100 (1938).
52. Adequate judicial review of ICC plans is circumscribed by the great complexity
of facts and figures involved in these proceedings. When the Commission has spent
years developing a proposed plan, the judge could hardly be expected to review it com-
prehensively in all its phases without a corps bf trained assistants.
53. Section 172 of Chapter X requires the reorganization judge to submit plans which
he considers worthy of consideration to the SEC for examination and report where the
scheduled indebtedness exceeds $3,000,000. Where the scheduled indebtedness is less, the
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courts, or by according the Commission greater powers and confining the
scope of judicial review. In view of the established procedure, the general
experience gained by the Commission in dealing with railroad reorganiza-
tion problems, and its greater opportunity for access to economic data, the
latter alternative seems the more expedient. Provision might be made fur
the initial formulation of a plan of reorganization by an independent trustee.
This would curtail the present tendency of committees to submit plans largely
for bargaining purposes. Under present procedure controlling groups can
make excessive original demands, through the proposal of plans favisralle
to themselves, in the hope that they will salvage the major part of those
demands in the final plan. Interim operation would be left with the district
court as at present, but the scope of judicial review on the plan itself should
be confined to correcting the Commission for errors of law and setting aside
findings not supported by substantial evidence. The structure of appeal
should be simplified. Appeal from the Commission on the completed plan
could be heard by a three-judge district court with review by petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court.54
Necessity for and Sufficiency of Findings. The chief ground for reversing
the Westcrn Pacific and St. Paud orders was the lack of findings of fact
on valuation data deemed necessary under the controlling mandate of the
Consolidated Rock Products case. This problem has two phases - the neces-
sity for and sufficiency of findings of total enterprise value, and the necessity
for and sufficiency of findings of value for purposes of distributing reorgan-
ization securities among the various classes of claimants. These two phase-
involve somewhat different considerations.
A determination of total enterprise value serves several important func-
tions in reorganization. In the first place, it serves a "foreclosure" purpose
in making it possible to determine which classes of claimants are to he elim-
inated from participation.55 It also has a "feasibility" function in providing
judge may in his discretion submit plans to the Commission. In both cases the reptrzm
submitted by the SEC are advisory only. Under § 173, however, the judge may n,,t
enter an order approving a plan until after the SEC has submitted its reltort iH it de-
cides to do so. The Commission may also, with the judge's approval, larticipati. in tht
proceedings. (§208). Where liquidated indebtedness exceeds $250,U0, the juIgo: i,,
required to appoint one or more trustees and he may do so if the indebtednLss is k-,.
(§ 156). Where a trustee is appointed, he prepares and files a plan before the dehtor
may propose plans. (§§ 169, 167). For a survey of the procedure under Chapter X .Vc
Frank, Epithetical Jitrisprudcnce and the Wor: of the Securities and Exchange Cow-
mission in the Administration of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act (1941) 18 N. Y. U.
L. Q. Rxv. 317.
54. This shortened appeal procedure was adopted under Chapter XV. § 713. The
special three-judge court created under that section -%as ranked with a Circuit C~urt of
Appeals in the weight to be accorded its conclusions. See Ackert v. Baltimore & 0.
R. R., 115 F. (2d) 455, 457 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941).
55. This is the function performed by the judicial sale in ordinary mortgage for.-
closure proceedings.
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for a capitalization of the reorganized company which will permit advan-
tageous future financing." Closely analogous is the "watered stock" func-
tion. A plan of reorganization should not,57 and, under many state statutes,
cannot be approved if it provides for the issuance of securities without full
value behind them.
Apparently the drafters of Section 77 did not intend that a valuation of
the property should be necessary in all cases.58 The statute is ambiguously
worded but does not specifically require a finding of total enterprise value.61"
Nor has the Commission adopted a practice of making a finding of total
enterprise value as such. Rather it has set out fully its subordinate findings
in regard to such valuation factors as reproduction cost new less deprecia-
tion, book investment, the physical value of the debtor's land, investments
in affiliated companies, and past and prospective earnings usually capitalized
at a rate of 5%. 60 In the great majority of cases the Commission has set
a maximum permissible capitalization of the enterprise"' without specifically
weighting the various factors considered by it in making the judgment.
56. There is no specific requirement that a proposed railroad reorganizationi plani
be "feasible." Cf. §221(2) of Chapter X and §366(3) of Chapter XI. Substantially
the same requirement is contained in §77(b)(4) providing that the total permissible
fixed charges must be related to earning power and in § 77(d) requiring plans to be
"compatible with the public interest."
57. See pp. 984--85 infra.
58. See Hearings before Committee on Judiciary on 11. R. 6249, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1935) 150-51, 317.
59. Section 77(e) says only that "if it shall be necessary to determine the value
of any property for any purpose under this section . . ." that valuation shall be made
with due consideration for certain specified factors. But the Act does not state when
a valuation is necessary. Section 77(e) also provides that it shall not be necessary
to submit plans to stockholders if the Commission shall have found, and tile judge shall
have affirmed the finding, that the equity of the stockholders was without value. The
Commission has apparently regarded this latter provision as specifying the only 1,recise
finding necessary with respect to value. Where stockholders have been eliminated, tile
ICC has uniformly made a specific finding that their equity was without value. See,
e.g., Western P. R. R. Reorganization, 230 I.C.C. 61, 100 (1938) ; Chicago & E. I. Ry.
Reorganization, 230 I.C.C. 199, 233 (1938); Chicago & N. W. Ry. Reorganization, 236
I.C.C. 575, 637 (1939) ; St. Louis S. W. Ry. Reorganization, 249 I.C.C. 5, 166 (1941).
A further specific finding of insolvency has not been deemed necessary by the ICC
under § 77. See St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Reorganization, 242 I.C.C. 523, 526 (1940).
60. See, for example, Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Reorganization, 242 I.C.C. 298,
429-38 (1940); New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Reorganization, 239 I.C.C. 337, 397
(1940) ; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Reorganization, 236 I.C.C. 575, 578-87 (1939) ; Western
P. R. R. Reorganization, 230 I.C.C. 61, 67-76 (1938).
61. In a few cases, the majority of them early, the ICC has failed to indicate
specifically the maximum permissible capitalization. Copper Range R. R. Reorgan-
ization, 212 I.C.C. 479 (1936) ; Chicago, S. S. & S. B. R. R. Reorganization, 212 I.C.C.
547 (1936) ; Kansas City, K. V. & W. R. R. Reorganization, 221 I.C.C. 15 (1937)
Reader R. R. Reorganization, 221 I.C.C. 190, 603 (1937) ; Savannah & A. Ry. Reor-
ganization, 224 I.C.C. 197 (1937) ; Spokane International Ry. Reorganization, 228
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This determination of total maximum capitalization should he considered
tantamount to a finding of value . 2 In at least one case the Commission
has specifically indicated that the total capitalization figure established repre-
sented "the worth of the assets that will be devoted by the reorganized
company to the service of transportation." e Such a determination, coupled
with the full reporting of subordinate evidence and findings, clearly satisfis
the ambiguous requirements of the statute. And it should also he sufficient
under the Consolidated Rock Products case. That decision seems to compel
a finding of value for the entire enterprise."4 But to impose a requirement
in railroad reorganizations that the Commission label its figure a "valua-
tion" rather than a "total capitalization" would constitute merely a formal
change in the method of presentation, and alone should not justify reversal.
Moreover, the Commission sets out adequate supporting data, even if the
various factors are not specifically weighted, to enable the judge to exercise
his independent judgment on the capitalization figure established. The
function of evidence in reorganization proceedings is to narrow the area in
which the line of a plan can be charted. Within the given field much is left
to experienced judgment. To require a detailed elaboration of the mental
processes of the Commission in selecting its final figure does not seem neces-
sary where ample subordinate findings are available.
In the Western Pacific case no maximum capitalization figure was estab-
lished in the Commission's reports, although a finding was made that the
claims of unsecured creditors and the equity of stockholders were without
value. 5 In view of its importance in the reorganization process, a specific
finding of total enterprise value or maximum capitalization does seem neces-
sary. But the Commission approximated the setting of a maximum capital-
ization figure in the Westcrn Pacific case when it proposed a new capital
structure for the reorganized company0 0 and this omission is not enough
to justify reversal.
A second and equally important phase of the valuation problem involves
the character of findings required in distributing reorganization securities
I.C.C. 387 (1938): Western P. R. R. Reorganization, 230 I.C.C. tol 1938); Denver
& R. G. W. R. R. Reorganization, 233 I.C.C. 515 (1939).
62. This was the approach taken in the St. Paid and Cldcaqo - Norlhc,,stcrn
cases. See notes 16 and 18 supra.
63. Chicago G. V. R. R. Reorganization, 228 I.C.C. 585, 642 (1938).
64. Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510, 520 t1941).
65. Western P. R. R. Reorganization, 230 I.C.C. 61, 101 (1938).
66. Western P. R. R. Reorganization, 230 I.C.C. 61, 96 (1938). The Commissi.in
stated: "Upon the issue of the securities above approved . . .. the t,,tal c pitalizati,,
excluding 313,703 shares of no-par-value common stock, would he $62,326,217, c,,u-
sisting of $3,066.117 of equipment obligations, $10.fl00,000 uf first-mtortgage 4-percent
bonds, $19.716,040 of income-mortgage 4-percent btnds, and $29,574,09 uf 5-percent
preferred stock. Treating the no-par-value common stock as $100 per ;hare, the tctal
capitalization would be $93,726,517." This capital structure was m'lified in minor
details in 233 I.C.C. 409, 412-13 (1939).
1942]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
among the various classes of claimants. The Consolidated Rock Products
decision was premised in part on the theory that fairness in distribution
requires a participation by various classes in proportion to the value of
their claims. Since the security structures of the larger railroads in reor-
ganization is extremely complex, a characteristic of the current group of
reorganization proceedings has been the attempted simplification of these
structures by substituting blanket mortgages for divisional mortgages as
security for bonds,67 and by consolidating into integrated systems various
subsidiaries with separate securities outstanding.68 The translation of these
separate and conflicting claims into system values is an undertaking of con-
siderable magnitude. Nevertheless, "at least an approximate ascertainment
of their respective assets" must be attempted or "the issue of fairness of
any plan of reorganization . . . cannot be intelligently resolved."'68
The Commission has undertaken the task of establishing a fair distribu-
tion of securities between divisional mortgage bondholders by use of
elaborate earnings segregation formulas,70 severance studies,71 and contribu-
tive income investigations. 72  Consideration is also given to the physical
properties subject to the various liens. Past and prospective earnings, repro-
duction cost, and book value of subsidiary companies are considered in
order to ascertain the approximate worth of their contribution to system
operations.73 The Commission has not, however, followed a practice of
making precise findings of value for each claim involved. Nor has it at-
tempted to define in other than par value terms the securities issued in
reorganization. Instead, it has reported the results of its various studies
and expressed its conclusions as to the relative values of the component
parts only in terms of the par or stated value of new securities issued. The
courts in the Western Pacific and St. Paul cases, basing their conclusions
on the Consolidated Rock Products decision, have held that more precise
findings of value are necessary.
It can be argued that the Consolidated case is not necessarily applicable
to railroad reorganizations under Section 77. The statute does not make
67. See, e.g., Chicago, M., St. P. and P. R. R. Reorganization, 239 I.C.C. 485
(1940); Chicago & N. W. Ry. Reorganization, 236 I.C.C. 575 (1939); Erie R. R.
Reorganization, 239 I.C.C. 653 (1940).
68. See especially Missouri P. R. R. Reorganization, 239 I.C.C. 7 (1940).
69. Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510, 525 (1941).
70. These formulas break down the revenues and operating expenses attributable
to the various mortgaged sections of a railroad.
71. Severance studies are designed to measure the loss of system net income which
would occur if the particular mortgaged line were operated as a separate system or by
another railroad.
72. Contributive income investigations are undertaken in order to ascertain the
benefit which the system as a whole derives from traffic originating or terminating
on each mortgaged line.
73. See, e.g., Missouri P. R. R. Reorganization, 239 I.C.C. 7, 32-45 (1940).
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findings of fact on valuation issues mandatory but requires only that "the
Commission shall state fully the reasons for its conclusions." 7 4 And the
Commission reports have apparently satisfied that vague requirement. How-
ever, the further statutory requirement that a plan be found fair and equit-
able and that the proposed distribution of securities conform to the law
of the land7 -would seem to make the Consolidated case applicable.
It can also be contended that the Consolidated decision itself does not
compel complete findings by the Commission on valuation data. In that case
the Supreme Court was confronted with a proposed plan where no adequate
valuation data were present on the earning capacity of the property, no
finding of total enterprise value predicated upon proper standards had been
made, and no segregation of assets subject to the two bond mortgages had
been attempted on any basis. Assuming that a total enterprise value based
upon proper standards had been placed upon the property, and that a formula
had been devised for segregating the values attributable to the two mortgage
bond issues, a distribution of securities based upon the results of that formula
might not have incurred the condemnation of the Court, even if no precise
findings had been made with respect to the values of the respective liens
surrendered. As long as all factors considered are fully set out, including
the formulas themselves, the method pursued in their application, and the
results obtained, the courts could presumably exercise their statutory func-
tion in determining whether the proposed distribution is fair and equitable.
The area of judgment in appraising these conflicting claims is so great that
requiring precise findings of value might mean only a translation of the
Commission's actual distribution of securities into absolute values without
any major alteration in the plan.
On the other hand, the Consolidated case prescribes definite standards of
fairness in reorganization which extend beyond the confines of particular
statutes. Fairness in participation is measured by the value of the claims
surrendered and senior creditors must be fully compensated before junior
interests are entitled to participate. The Consolidated decision should not
be viewed as an attempt to straight-jacket reorganization procedure. The
type and extent of inquiry and the method of presenting valuation data may
well vary as occasion demands. The particular formula of distribution
adopted will remain largely a matter of experienced judgment. Values in
reorganization can at best only be appro-imated. But the standard remains
fixed. If the full compensation rule is to be something more than a profession
of doctrine, judgment must be predicated on specific findings as to the value
of the claims surrendered and the worth of the new securities issued in
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STANDARDS GOVERNING VALUATION
Much confusion in railroad reorganizations has been caused by the failure
of both courts and Commission to establish definitive standards governing
valuation and for this the uncertain directions contained in the statute are
primarily responsible. Section 77(e) provides that due consideration shall
be given to past, present, and prospective earning power and to all other
relevant facts in valuing railroad properties. Unwarranted fears raised by
previous Supreme Court dicta in regard to the inclusion of reproduction
cost data in valuing railroads for rate-making purposes led to the enactment
in 77(e) of the further provision that only such effect shall he given to
reproduction cost and original cost as may be required by the law of the
landJ 6 While this section of the statute was apparently regarded by its
drafters as merely cautionary and not as providing a formula for valuation,"
it has not been so construed by either courts or Commission, and no attempt
to adopt an exclusive earning power test has been made. Cost data have
been considered on all issues of valuation. The Commission has asserted
that its primary emphasis has been directed to earning power in formulating
reorganization plans.78 Yet its total capitalizations have been set at a figure
substantially higher than those which would have resulted from the capital-
ization of past or prospective earnings.10
The Consolidated Rock Products decision should have allayed all fears
as to the necessity for including cost data in determining valuation for reor-
76. In the historic decision of Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1898), the Supreme
Court declared that value determination for purposes of rate-making was a question
of fact to be ascertained after consideration of all relevant facts. Those facts included
original cost, amounts expended on permanent improvements, the market value of bond,,
and stocks, present cost of construction, probable earning capacity under the particular
rates prescribed, and the sum required to meet operating expenses. In a later decision,
the Supreme Court reversed the Commission because of its failure to include repro-
duction cost as an element of value in determining rate-base valuation. St. Louis &
O'Fallon Ry. v. United States, 279 U. S. 461 (1929). Consequently, in drafting § 77,
it was feared that these decisions required inclusion of reproduction cost and original
cost as elements of value. See Hearings before Committee on Judiciary on H. R. 6240,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 30. A recent decision by the Supreme Court has emaseu-
lated the rule of Smyth v. Ames in this connection. Reproduction cost need no longer
be considered as an element of value even for rate-making purposes. The reasonableness
of the rates proposed by a regulatory body is the extent of the court's inlquiry-not
the method of determining those rates. Federal Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline
Co., (1942) 10 U. S. L. WEEK 4274 (U. S. 1942).
77. Craven and Fuller, The 1935 Amendments of the Railroad Bankruptcy Law
(1936) 49 HARV. L. REv. 1254, 1275, n. 64.
78. See Western P. R. R. Reorganization, 230 I.C.C. 61, 87 (1938) ; Erie R. R.
Reorganization, 239 I.C.C. 653, 717 (1940) ; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. Reorganization,
242 I.C.C. 298, 390-91 (1940); Chicago & N. W. Ry. Reorganization, 236 I.C.C. 575,
671 (1939) (concurring opinion).
79. See Comment (1941) 54 HARv. L. REv. 655, 662.
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ganization purposes. Nevertheless, the rule announced in that case was
regarded as qualified by Section 77(e) in the St. Paul and Chicago & North-
western opinions.80 Although the Supreme Court did not specifically reject
or define the applicability of physical appraisals in the Consolidated case,81
its emphasis was placed solely upon earning power.s2 In view of the legis-
lative background of Section 77(e), it would seem that the Consolidated
case is not qualified by the statute but goes far in clarifying it. Congress in
1935 would probably have sanctioned earning power as the sole test of value
had it not been plagued by Constitutional doubts. Apparently those doubts
alone83 were responsible for inserting in the statute the provision that repro-
duction and original cost should be considered in a negative manner - only
to the extent required by the law of the land. Consequently, the Consolidated
case, by implying that a consideration of cost data is not required under the
law of the land, would seem to sanction the adoption of past, present, and
prospective earnings as the sole determinant of value under Section 77(e).8
No reason is apparent for distinguishing between standards applicable to
industrial concerns and railroads in reorganization. It can be argued that,
80. In re Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R., 124 F. (2d) 754, 763, 764, 766 (C. C. A.
7th, 1942) ; In re Chicago & N. W. Ry., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. (3d ed. 1941) 53,619
(C. C. A. 7th, 1942).
81. The court reversed because no consideration at all had been given to earning
power in determining value.
82. See Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U. S. 510. 526 (1941). The
court stated: ". . . 'the commercial value of property consists in the expectation of
income from it.' . . . Such criterion is the appropriate one here, since we are dealing
with the issue of solvency arising in connection with reorganization plans involving pro-
ductive properties. It is plain that valuations for other purposes are not relevant to or
helpful in a determination of that issue, except as they may indirectly bear on earning
capacity." The SEC has adopted the prospective earning power test of value for oper-
ating properties in reorganization. The Higbee Co., Corporate Reorganization Release
No. 39, March 25, 1941; Deep Rock Oil Corp., 7 S. E. C. 174, 181 (1940) ; Jome, The
Vew,, Schohnaster in Finance (1942) 40 Mien. L. RFv. 625, 632-33; Comment (1941)
51 YALE L. J. 85, 88-92; Comment (1941) 55 HARv. L. REv. 125. The SEC has rejected
reproduction cost new less depreciation as an adequate test. La France Industries, 5
S. E. C. 917, 926 (1939); National Radiator Corp., 4 S. E. C. 690, 695 (1939). Of
course, liquidation values are relevant where a portion of the business or the whole
enterprise wvill ultimately be discontinued. McKesson and Robbins, Inc., Corporate Re-
organization Release No. 41, March 29, 1941; Penn. Timber Co., 4 S. E. C. 630 (1939).
83. See Hearings before Committee on Judiciary on H. R. 649, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1935) at p. 30, where 'Mr. Leslie Craven, who drafted the valuation provision,
stated: "We are afraid to come right out and say, 'You shall nut consider reproduction
cost.'" The whole tenor of the hearings indicates an attempt to read cost data out of
reorganization valuation insofar as constitutionally possible. The Wheeler-Truman Bill,
passed by the Senate in 1939, gave chief consideration to capitalized average annual earn-
ings over the previous 12 years. See SEx. Rae. No. 454, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
84. See Spaeth and Windle, T'alation of Railroads under Section 77 of the Ban!-
ruptcy Act (1938) 32 ILL. L. REv. 517; but cf. Caplin, lFaluation and Earnings in Rail-
road Reorganization: A Consideration of the Proposed Anendment to Section 77 (1941)
27 VA. L. REv. 769.
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because the earnings of a railroad are regulated by public authority and
because rates set are based upon the valuation of the road, it would be a
circular process to determine valuation in reorganization by earnings. This
contention is not sound. The process of regulating railroads has largely
shifted from the problem of reducing monopolistic rates to that of providing
any return at all to an industry beset by an expanding competition. 0 Amend-
ments to the Interstate Commerce Act have recognized this by providing
an approach in determining rate levels which has largely supplanted rate-
base valuation."0 Moreover, the underlying basis for determining value varies
with the function and purpose for which the resulting figure is intended.
There is no necessary correlation between applicable standards of value for
rate-making and for reorganization purposes.8 7
Forthright adoption of an earning power standard would go far in im-
proving the entire procedure under Section 77. The inclusion of cost data
as a vital factor in the valuation process has probably been one of the under-
lying reasons for the failure of the Commission to make definitive findings
of value in passing upon plans of reorganization. The Commission may
have feared attack on such findings in the courts because of the uncertainty
of emphasis required by the statute to be placed upon cost data. Moreover,
it would seem inherently difficult to assign specific weight to factors which
would generally give such varying results as costs and earning power. Under
present procedure it would always seem possible to direct a frontal attack
on Commission plans in the courts by contending that the Commission result
gave insufficient weight to either earnings or costs.88 Adoption of the earn-
ings test would also restrict the types of evidence to be offered in hearings,
thus narrowing the ultimate area of judgment as well as eliminating the
time-consuming presentation and consideration of cost figures. The avail-
able scope of attack on plans in the courts would likewise be reduced.
Adoption of the earnings test would not only expedite procedure: it
would lead as well to the formulation of sounder capital structures. Over-
85. See 52d ANN. REP. I. C. C. (1938) 17; Hearings before Committee on Judi-
ciary op H. R. 10387, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 27-53.
86. 48 STAT. 220 (1933), 49 U. S. C. § 15(a) (1941). See Hearings before Committee
on Judiciary on H. R. 6249, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 44-45.
87. In Temner v. Denver Tramway Co., 18 F. (2d) 226 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927), the
court distinguished value for rate-making purposes from value in determining solvency
and held that rate base value was not an adequate criterion for determining value for
insolvency purposes. The view that valuation is purposive has been well-expressed lit
Spaeth and Windle, Valuation of Railroads under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act
(1938) 32 ILL. L. REv. 517, 526. This approach has been adopted by the SEC. Jome, The
New Schoolmaster in Finance (1942) 40 MIcn. L. REv. 625, 632. The ICC has ex-
pressed similar views. See Chicago, R. 1. & P. Ry. Reorganization, 247 I. C. C. 533,
539 (1941).
88. Objections of this nature appear to have been made in the St. Pai case. See
In re Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R., 124 F. (2d) 754, 760 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941).
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valuation may not result in overcapitalization if fixed charges are properly
related to the expected course of income. However, overvaluation may well
lead to excessive stock issues not prope.rly correlated to earnings and create
a "watered stock" problem. 9 The possibilities for future stock financing
are thereby curtailed. And if, in lean years, interest cannot be paid on in-
come bonds, financing through that medium on advantageous terms becomes
impossible. Resort to fixed-interest debt securities results and the enter-
prise is started on the road to another reorganization.
Greater emphasis upon earning power would likewise seem advisable in
view of the "full compensation" rule announced in the Consolidated Roc:
Products case. In that decision, the Supreme Court declared that senior
classes of security holders must be fully compensated for their lost rights
before junior security holders are entitled to participate in reorganization.
Moreover, "prior rights are not recognized . . . if creditors are given
only a face amount of inferior securities equal to the face amount of their
claims." 0 The ICC has in some cases distributed common and preferred
stocks to creditor interests in partial satisfaction of their claims while also
permitting stockholders to participate in reorganization."' Feasibility may
properly require the issuance of inferior securities to bondholders in satis-
faction of their claims.9 2 But inasmuch as fairness requires that the treat-
ment accorded bondholders be fully compensatory, some approximate ascer-
tainment of the value attributable to the new securities would seem necessary.
And that value must be ascertained in more precise terms than the par or
stated value of the new securities.93 A thorough analysis of new securities
in terms of prospective earnings would seem to be the most expeditious
method of determining those values.94
89. See Comment (1941) 54 HARv. L. R Ev. 655, 658.
90. Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U. S. 510, 525 (1941).
91. Erie R. R. Reorganization, 239 I. C. C. 653 (1940), approved, In re Erie R. R.,
37 F. Supp. 237 (N. D. Ohio 1940); Chicago G. W. R. R. Reorganization, 228 1. C. C.
585 (1938), approved, In re Chicago G. W. R. R., 29 F. Supp. 149 (N. D. II. 1939).
See Comment (1941) 51 YALE L. J. 85, 105-06.
92. Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U. S. 510, 528 (1941).
93. Gilchrist, "Fair and Equitable" Plan of Reoranicatio,: -I Clearer Concept
(1941) 26 CoRN. L. Q. 592, 619.
94. The SEC has adopted the test of evaluating new reorganization securities in
terms of book value predicated upon prospective earnings. See McKesson and Robbins,
Inc., Corporate Reorganization Release No. 41, March 29, 1941, pp. 24-25; cf. La France
Industries, 5 SEC 917, 930-32 (1939).
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